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Abstract—It is well-known that demand response can improve the system efficiency as well as lower consumers’ (prosumers’)
electricity bills. However, it is not clear how we can either qualitatively identify the prosumer with the most impact potential or
quantitatively estimate each prosumer’s contribution to the total social welfare improvement when additional resource capacity/flexibility
is introduced to the system with demand response, such as allowing net-selling behavior. In this work, we build upon existing literature
on the electricity market, which consists of price-taking prosumers each with various appliances, an electric utility company and a
social welfare optimizing distribution system operator, to design a general sensitivity analysis approach (GSAA) that can estimate the
potential of each consumer’s contribution to the social welfare when given more resource capacity. GSAA is based on existence of an
efficient competitive equilibrium, which we establish in the paper. When prosumers’ utility functions are quadratic, GSAA can give
closed forms characterization on social welfare improvement based on duality analysis. Furthermore, we extend GSAA to a general
convex settings, i.e., utility functions with strong convexity and Lipschitz continuous gradient. Even without knowing the specific forms
the utility functions, we can derive upper and lower bounds of the social welfare improvement potential of each prosumer, when extra
resource is introduced. For both settings, several applications and numerical examples are provided: including extending AC comfort
zone, ability of EV to discharge and net selling. The estimation results show that GSAA can be used to decide how to allocate
potentially limited market resources in the most impactful way.
Index Terms—Demand response, competitive equilibrium, optimization duality, sensitivity analysis, utility function, strong convexity,
Lipschitz continuous gradient.
F
1 INTRODUCTION
A S opposed to the traditional supply-follow-demandapproach, demand response (DR) provides consumers
an opportunity to balance the supply and demand of elec-
tricity systems by responding to time-based pricing signals
[1], [2], [3], [4], [5], [6], [7], [8]. Appropriately designed pric-
ing signals can encourage consumers to move their flexible
demand from the high-demand periods to relatively low-
demand periods [9], [10], [11], or also encourage prosumers,
i.e., who can both produce and consume [12], to store the
electricity into their energy storage or EVs at low pricing
periods and use energy in high pricing periods [13], or
even sell/discharge it back to the system to obtain eco-
nomic reward [14], [15]. By encouraging the consumers’ or
prosumers’ (for simplicity, we call both of them prosumers
in the rest of the paper) participation, DR can significantly
lower the system load fluctuation, increase the system effi-
ciency, reduce consumers’ electricity bills and thus improve
the total social welfare [16], [17].
Even though DR has huge potential social benefits, the
practical implementation still faces a lot of challenges [18],
[19]. For hardware, the implementation could require up-
grade or installation of lines, smart meters or other power
devices. For software, the implementation may require well-
designed algorithms to calculate the optimal pricing signal
or control strategy that can manage flexible appliances. For
the market environment, it may require utility companies or
aggregators to make advertisement or campaign persuading
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customers to join DR project. However, to make all of these
conditions satisfied requires huge amount of investment,
whereas the budgets are usually limited [20], [21], [22].
In this paper, we aim to address the question of how
we can use the limited budget to most efficiently expand
the current resource capacity, such as the total amount of
allowed net-selling. One solution is to identify and prioritize
prosumers with highest potential impact on social welfare,
and invest in them first in order to maximize the social
welfare improvement. There are some related studies on
prosumers’ marginal contribution in DR. Most of them focus
on the flexibility or price-responsiveness of a certain type
of appliances [23], [24], [25]. Some of them study the DR
resources’ capacity value based on simulations or empirical
analysis [26], [27]. However, to the best of our knowledge,
there is no related studies providing a general tool quantify-
ing or estimating different prosumers’ potential impact on
social welfare under a dynamic pricing environment, which
is the problem the paper provides solutions to. A key to this
problem is to find connections between prosumers’ utility
function/their usage behaviors and the social welfare.
To find this connection, we build upon the existing
literature on the dynamic pricing DR market framework [5],
[9], [25] to model a market with price-taking prosumers with
various appliances, a price-taking electric utility company
and a price-setting social welfare maximizing distribution
system operator (DSO). In the market, each prosumer max-
imizes their own payoff function with considering flexible
appliances’ energy consumption constraints; the utility com-
pany maximizes its profit, and the DSO sets appropriate
dynamic pricing signals to maximize the social welfare and
clears the market. We first model all different types of pro-
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2sumers’ constraints by a general linear constraint. Then we
show there exists an efficient competitive equilibrium and
an equivalence relationship between DSO’s problem and the
prosumers’ and the utility company’s problems. Based on
the general linear constraint and the equivalence relation-
ship, we propose a general sensitivity analysis approach
(GSAA) to quantify the effect of prosumers’ contribution
on social welfare when more resource is injected into the
system, modeled by enlarging their constraint sets.
Since each prosumer’s usage behavior is highly related
to their own preference, which is commonly modeled by
a (net) utility function [9], [12], [25], [28], [29], the charac-
teristics of different types of utility functions could affect
the connection between prosumers’ usage behaviors and the
social welfare, thus could also change the way we quantify
or estimate each prosumer’s contribution on social welfare.
In this work, we consider two types of (net) utility function
settings, quadratic function, which is commonly used in
many DR related papers [9], [25], [28], [29] and general
convex function (i.e., strongly convex and with Lipschitz
continuous gradient), which is more general and captures a
variety of functions.
As the main contributions of this paper, we relate the
potential social welfare improvement and individual pro-
sumer by duality theory and use the proposed GSAA to
characterize the shadow prices associated with more re-
sources in the system, i.e., a larger constraint set. When
the net utility functions have quadratic forms, we derive
the shadow prices explicitly and when the utility functions
have general convex form, we establish the bounds of
the shadow prices. Under different utility settings, several
applications of GSAA are provided, including enlarging a
prosumer’s AC comfort zone size, allowing a prosumer’s
EV to discharge and allowing a prosumer to net sell. The
estimation can be used to identify the prosumers with the
most potential impact on social welfare. Thus, when the
budgets for implementing DR are limited, we could allocate
them to those prosumers accordingly. We also provide a
case study in the general convex settings to compare 2
prosumers’ contribution potentials for allowing them to
discharge EVs. The two prosumers are identical, except that
one’s net utility function is the other’s scaled by a constant.
We would expect the one with a larger utility function to
have a higher contribution potential, but to our surprise, the
bounds of the shadow price given by GSAA show otherwise
under certain conditions. Lastly, several numerical studies
about the usage of GSAA in net-selling and EV discharging
are provided.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section
2, we introduce the system model and the general linear
constraint. In Section 3, we prove the existence of the
efficient market equilibrium and the equivalence between
DSO problem and prosumers’ and the utility companies’
problems, which form the foundation of GSAA. Section
4 studies the usage of GSAA under quadratic net utility
function settings, where the closed-form shadow price are
calculated and Section 5 talks about the usage of GSAA
under the general convex settings in which the bounds of
the shadow price are derived. In Sections 6, we provide
numerical studies to illustrate the usage of GSAA.
Notations: Throughout the paper, we use bold font to rep-
resent vectors variables, and superscript H for transpose.
Notation (xi,∀i) denotes vector [x1, x2, ..., xn]T . For col-
umn vectors x1, x2, ..., xn, we use notation (xi,∀i) to denote
a combined column vector
[
xT1 , x
T
2 , ..., x
T
n
]T
. For a vector
x = [x1, x2, ..., xn]
T , we denote the jth element of x as
[x]j .The operator [·]+ is given by [a]+ = max{a, 0}. We
use ‖ · ‖ to denote that Euclidean norm or L2 norm. For
a matrix A, we denote its element on the ith row and the
jth column as [A]ij . Inequalities, <, ≤, >, ≥ are used in an
element-wise sense. The notation diag{A} denotes a column
vector consists of the diagonal elements of matrix A. We
use notation diag (A,B) to denote matrix
[
A 0
0 B
]
. For a
function f(x1, x2, ..., xn) : Rn → R, ∇f is the gradient of f ,
and ∇f = ( ∂f∂x1 ,
∂f
∂x2
, ..., ∂f∂xn )
T .
2 SYSTEM MODEL
In this section, we introduce our general market model
consisting of three participants: prosumers, an electric utility
company and a DSO. We use N = {0, 1, 2, ..., N} to denote
the set of all nodes in the power network. Without loss
of generality, we let node 0 represent the electric utility
company and the nodes in N+ = {1, 2, ..., N} represent
individual prosumers. In rest of the paper, the words ‘pro-
sumer node’ and ‘prosumer’ are used interchangeably. Sim-
ilarly, we do not distinguish between the words ‘electric
utility company node’, ‘electric utility company’ or ‘utility
company’ unless otherwise noted. The DSO, as a social
planner and a system operator, maximizes the social welfare
while clearing the market and guarantees system operation
reliability. The market we consider here is a retail electricity
market with no uncertainty and H periods, indexed by
t ∈ H = {1, 2, ...,H}. We assume in this market both
prosumers and the electric utility company are price-taking.
We call the market H-period DR market.
For each prosumer i ∈ N+, let Ai denote the set of
household appliances, such as lights, air conditioners (ACs),
washers, energy storage and electric vehicles (EVs). For each
appliance a ∈ Ai, we define its power consumption scheduling
vector as qDi,a
∆
=
(
qDi,a (t) ,∀t
)
in RH where qi,a (t) ∈ R
represents the power consumption of prosumer i’s appli-
ance a at time t, and superscript D indicates the demand
side (i.e., the prosumers). We can concatenate these vectors
to define for each prosumer i, qDi
∆
=
(
qDi,a,∀a
)
in RH|Ai|
and the aggregate vector for all prosumers, qD ∆=
(
qDi ,∀i
)
in RH
∑
i∈N+ |Ai|. For the utility company (superscript S
representing the supply side), we define its power supply
scheduling vector as qS , where qS ∆=
(
qS (t) ,∀t) in RH .
At last, we define the market clearing electricity price vector,
which is announced by DSO, as p ∆= (p (t) ,∀t) in RH .
2.1 Prosumer Model
In our model, prosumers (i.e., users who can both buy and
sell back electricity) optimize their power schedules to max-
imize their own payoffs. Here the payoff function is defined
by a quasilinear function Ui
(
qDi
)−Ci (qDi )−∑a∈Ai pTqDi,a,
which includes a utility function Ui : RH|Ai| → R that
reflects prosumer i’s preference on energy consumption for
3appliances, a cost function Ci : RH|Ai| → R representing
amortized battery life loss for EVs and energy storage
(for other non-battery appliances, Ci = 0), and payments∑
a∈Ai p
TqDi,a. The combination terms Ui
(
qDi
) − Ci (qDi )
are also called net utility function. With these components,
the prosumers’ problem (P) is formulated as follows. For
each prosumer i ∈ N+
max
qDi
Ui
(
qDi
)
− Ci
(
qDi
)
−
∑
a∈Ai
pTqDi,a, (P1)
s.t. AiqDi ≤ hi, (P2)
We adopt the following simplifying assumption:
Assumption 1. Prosumer i’s utility function Ui(qDi ) and cost
function Ci(qDi ) are separable over appliances and time periods.
Having the above assumption, prosumer i’s utility func-
tion and cost function can be written as
Ui(qDi ) =
∑
a∈Ai
∑
t∈H
U ti,a(q
D
i,a (t)), (1)
Ci(qDi ) =
∑
a∈Ai
∑
t∈H
Cti,a(q
D
i,a (t)), (2)
where U ti,a : R→ R is the utility function for appliance a at
time t and Cti,a : R → R is the cost function for appliance a
at time t, and we adopt the following standard assumptions
for functions U ti,a and C
t
i,a:
Assumption 2. Functions −U ti,a(qDi,a (t)) and Cti,a(qDi,a (t))
are convex non-decreasing and differentiable in their respective
effective domains. The gradient of the net utility function at 0 is
element-wise positive, i.e. ∇Ui (0)−∇Ci (0) > 0.
We note that, in the prosumer model (P), there is no
sign restriction on qDi,a, meaning that the prosumers can
either consume or produce/sell electricity (hence the name
prosumer).
The set of linear inequalities AiqDi ≤ hi includes repre-
sentations of different power consumption requirements for
household appliances of prosumer i. Particularly, for all the
appliances, we divide them into two types based on their
flexibility: flexible appliances and inflexible appliances.
For flexible appliances such as ACs, washers, dry-
ers, dishwashers, fridges, EVs/PHEVs and energy storage,
whose power consumption may change depending on the
price, their constraints (P2) can be written as the following
forms based on [9], [5] and [30].
qDi,a (t) ≤ qDi,a (t) , qDi,a (t) ≥ qDi,a (t) ∀t, (3)∑
t∈Hi,a
αi,a (t) q
D
i,a (t) ≤ Q
D
i,a,
∑
t∈Hi,a
αi,a (t) q
D
i,a (t) ≥ QDi,a,
(4)
where constraint (3) represents an available range of the
power consumption for the flexible appliance at time period
t. For AC, it means the power should between 0 and the
rated power; for EV/PHEV and energy storage, it means the
power should be between maximal discharging power and
maximal charging power. Note that the power lower bound
qD
i,a
(t) could be negative for EVs, PHEVs and energy stor-
age, which reflects the definition of prosumer. Constraint
(4) indicates an acceptable energy consumption range of the
flexible appliance during the pre-specified periods of time
Hi,a ⊂ H.1 We call these periods in total a flexible period,
during which the appliance can adjust its power schedule
as long as it can finish certain task within certain energy
usage limit. For example, AC consumes enough (but not
too much) energy to maintain the room temperature [9],
[30] in a comfortable level during the hottest time of day
in summer, a washer finishes laundry by a specified time
set by its user, an EV owner charges/discharges his/her
car at home overnight for a trip the next day, or energy
storage keeps its battery level within certain range to ensure
a longer battery life. The coefficient αi,a (t) in constraint (4)
is used to capture efficiency (in a broad sense) of different
types of flexible appliances. For most appliances such as
washers, EVs and storage, αi,a (t) is a power loss factor in
an energy transmission process. In an ideal case, αi,a (t) is
set to constant 1, meaning there’s no loss in the process.
For AC, coefficient αi,a (t) has a more special meaning,
which describes time dynamic relationships between room
temperature and AC power schedules.
For inflexible appliances such as lights, routers, monitor
cameras, computers, TVs etc., their power consumption
constraints can be written as the form of inequalities (3)
(without (4)), i.e., the power consumption in each period
is in a certain range.
In addition to representing the appliance power con-
sumption requirements, the constraint AiqDi ≤ hi also
describes prosumer i’s type of usage behavior, which can
be divided into three types: simple buyers, net buyers and
net sellers. The simple buyers are users who only consume
energy, but do not discharge energy back to grid (for their
own usage or selling to others). Their DR constraints can
be described by (3)-(4) with qD
i,a
(t) ≥ 0, which implies that
their qDi,a (t) is non-negative. The net buyers are users who
can consume energy, store energy and discharge for their
own usage but cannot sell to others. Their DR constraints
can be described by (3)-(4) and the following constraint:∑
a∈Ai
qDi,a (t) ≥ 0, ∀t. (5)
Lastly, the net sellers are those who can consume, store and
sell energy to others. Their DR constraints can be covered
by (3) and (4) only. To avoid trivial cases, we make the
following assumption:
Assumption 3. In the problem (P), the feasible set is nonempty.
2.2 Electric Utility Company Model
The electric utility company maximizes its profit (equal
to revenue minus cost) by optimizing its power supply
scheduling qS . Hence, the electric utility company’s prob-
lem (U) is formulated by
max
qS
pTqS − C0
(
qS
)
, (U)
where C0 : RH → R is the cost function and assumed to
be convex and continuously differentiable in its effective
1. If an appliance has multiple flexible periods in H, then the appli-
ance has multiple constraints in form (4). For the detailed models of
appliances, interested readers are referred to [9] and [30].
4domain. To avoid trivial cases, we make the following
assumption:
Assumption 4. In problem (U), there exists at least one global
optimal solution.
2.3 Distribution System Operator Model
Distribution system operator is a benevolent system plan-
ner, which maximizes the social welfare as well as keeps the
supply-demand balance. The problem DSO solves, referred
to as (D), is given below.
max
qD,qS
U
(
qD
)
− C
(
qD
)
− C0
(
qS
)
, (D1)
s.t. AqD ≤ h, (D2)
qS =
∑
i∈N+
∑
a∈Ai
qDi,a, (D3)
where the objective function in (D1) is the social welfare.
Function U : RH
∑
i∈N+ |Ai| → R is prosumers’ total utility
function, defined by U(qD) =
∑
i∈N+ Ui(q
D
i ). Similarly,
C : RH
∑
i∈N+ |Ai| → R is prosumers’ total cost function,
defined by C(qD) =
∑
i∈N+ Ci(q
D
i ). We know that U(q
D)
and C(qD) are concave and convex respectively due to
Assumption 2.
The constraint AqD ≤ h in (D2) is an aggregation of the
constraint (P2), AiqDi ≤ hi, for all prosumers. Specifically,
A = diag (A1, A2, ..., AN ), qD =
(
qDi ,∀i ∈ N+
)
and h =(
hDi ,∀i ∈ N+
)
.
We call the jth constraint for prosumer i in (D2) (i.e., the
jth row of AiqDi ≤ hi) as the jth general linear constraint for
prosumer i, which can be written as the following,∑
a∈A(j)i
∑
t∈H(j)i,a
α
(j)
i,a (t) q
D
i,a (t) ≤ [hi]j , (6)
where A(j)i ⊂ Ai and H(j)i,a ⊂ H. We note that constraint
(6) covers all individual constraints (i.e., (3)-(5)) appeared
in (D2) and gives each individual constraint a unique label.
When Eq. (6) represents (3) or (4), the value [hi]j specifies
available ranges of power consumption for prosumer i’s ap-
pliances. When Eq. (6) represents (5), [hi]j restricts prosumer
i’s net-selling amounts. In either case, [hi]j reflects prosumer
i’s capacity of resources in DR. For generality, we call each
[hi]j as a Resource Capacity (RC) for prosumer i.
The constraint (D3) is the supply and demand balance
equation. We refer to this as the market clearing condition. We
call the dual variable associated with the constraint (D3) as
the market clearing price.
3 EFFICIENT MARKET EQUILIBRIUM
We first introduce basic definitions used in this section.
Definition 1 (Competitive Equilibrium). A competitive equi-
librium is defined by a demand-supply allocation and a price
vector in a market such that all agents’ (prosumers’ and the utility
company’s) choices are individually optimal (for problems (P) and
(U)) given the price, and the market clears.
Definition 2 (Efficient Allocation). An allocation is efficient if
it solves optimization problem (D).
The main goal of this section is to show that in the
proposed H-period DR market, there exists a competitive
equilibrium with an efficient allocation, and the compet-
itive equilibrium set is equivalent2 to the set of efficient
allocations and the corresponding market clearing prices. In
particular, it is described by the following theorem, whose
statement partially appeared in our previous conference
paper [31]. Here we provide the complete version and its
detailed proof.
Theorem 3.1. In the proposed H-period DR market, (1) there
exists an efficient demand-supply allocation
(
qD, qS
)
and a price
vector p such that
(
qD, qS , p
)
forms a competitive equilibrium;
(2) set V1 =
{ (
qD, qS , p
)
:
(
qD, qS , p
)
is a competitive
equilibrium
}
, is equivalent to set V2 =
{ (
qD, qS , p
)
:
(
qD, qS
)
is an efficient allocation and p is its market clearing price
}
.
Proof. (1) We prove Theorem 3.1 (1) by construction. First,
based on Assumptions 1-3, we know problem (D)’s objective
function is continuous and concave, and its feasible set
given by (D2) and (D3) is convex, nonempty and com-
pact. By Weierstrass extreme value theorem, there exists
a bounded optimal solution
(
qD∗,qS∗
)
. Then the optimal
objective value of (D) is finite. Also due to linear forms of
(3)-(5) and (D3), we know problem (D) has affine constraints.
Hence, by Proposition 5.3.1 on existence of primal and
dual optimal solutions in [32], the dual optimal solution
for problem (D) exists. Let (λ∗,ρ∗) denote a dual optimal
solution pair to problem (D), where vectors λ∗ and ρ∗
are Lagrange multipliers for the constraints (D2) and (D3)
respectively. Then the following Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT)
conditions hold:
AiqD∗i − hi ≤ 0, ∀i ∈ N+, (PF1)
qS∗ =
∑
i∈N+
∑
a∈Ai
qD∗i,a , (PF2)
λ∗i ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ N+, (DF)
diag
{
λ∗i
(
AiqD∗i − hi
)T}
= 0, ∀i ∈ N+, (CS)
− ∂U
∂qD
(
qD∗
)
+
∂C
∂qD
(
qD∗
)
+ATλ∗ + ν∗ = 0, (FOC1)
∂C0
∂qS
(
qS∗
)
− ρ∗ = 0, (FOC2)
where vector λ∗i is the Lagrange multiplier that asso-
ciated with prosumer i’s constraints in (D2), thus we
have λ∗ = (λ∗i , ∀i ∈ N+). Vector ν∗ is given by ν∗ =[
ρ∗T ,ρ∗T , ...,ρ∗T
]T
with ρ∗T repeated
∑
i∈N+ |Ai| times.
In the above KKT conditions, constraints (PF1) and (PF2)
describe primal feasibility, inequalities in (DF) reflect dual
feasibility, equations in (CS) are complimentary slackness
conditions, and equations (FOC1) and (FOC2) are first order
optimality conditions. When DSO sets the market price to
p = ρ∗ =
∂C0
∂qS
(
qS∗
)
,
conditions (PF1), (DF), (CS) and (FOC1) guarantee qD∗i
(selected from qD∗) and λ∗i satisfy problem (P)’s KKT con-
2. We say set A is equivalent to set B, if there exists a 1-1 mapping of
set A onto set B.
5dition, as shown below
AiqD∗i − hi ≤ 0, λ∗i ≥ 0, diag
{
λ∗i
(
AiqD∗i − hi
)T}
= 0,
− ∂Ui
∂qDi
(
qD∗i
)
+
∂Ci
∂qDi
(
qD∗i
)
+ATi λ
∗
i + pi = 0,
where pi =
[
pT ,pT , ...,pT
]T
with pT repeated |Ai| times,
and because the convex problem (P)’s strong duality holds,
which is guaranteed by Assumption 3 (refer to discussions
of constraint qualifications in Section 5.2.3 of [33]), the
quantity qD∗i is also an optimal solution to problem (P).
Similarly, the quantity qS∗ in
(
qD∗,qS∗
)
is also an
optimal solution to problem (U), because condition (FOC2)
guarantees qS∗ satisfy problem (U)’s optimality condition,
as shown below
∂C0
∂qS
(
qS∗
)
− p = 0.
Hence, the pair
(
qD∗,qS∗,p
)
form a competitive equilib-
rium. This completes the proof of (1).
(2) We follow the same notation as in the first part. For
any competitive equilibrium
(
qD∗,qS∗,p
) ∈ V1, let λ∗ =
(λ∗i ,∀i ∈ N+), where λ∗i is the dual optimal solution to
prosumer i’s problem (P) and let ρ∗ = p. Then we know(
qD∗,qS∗
)
and (λ∗,ρ∗) satisfy problem (D)’s KKT condi-
tions, since a combination of (P)’s KKT conditions, (U)’s
optimality condition, the market clearing equation and the
above equations together forms problem (D)’s KKT condi-
tions. By strong duality of problem (D) due to Assumption
3, we have
(
qD∗,qS∗
)
and (λ∗,ρ∗) are primal and dual
optimal solutions to problem (D), thus
(
qD∗,qS∗,p
) ∈ V2.
Conversly, if
(
qD∗,qS∗,p
) ∈ V2, then by the same process
of proof of (1), we know as long as the DSO sets price
to p = ∂C0∂qS
(
qS*
)
,
(
qD∗,qS∗,p
)
becomes a competitive
equilibrium, thus
(
qD∗,qS∗,p
) ∈ V1. This shows V1 = V2.
Hence, we obtain V1 is equivalent to V2.
The above theorem is related to the fundamental the-
orems of welfare in economics [34], but they are different
because of the physical constraint (D2). From the theorem,
we obtain an equivalence relationship between problem
(D) and problems (P) and (U). This relationship makes it
possible for us, by only focusing on problem (D), to analyze
sensitivity of prosumers’ contribution on social welfare in
optimal DR with the change of the resource capacity, [hi]j .
The analysis applies to many situations, such as the change
of AC comfort zone size, allowing prosumers to be net-
sellers and allowing EVs to discharge. For example, we can
analyze the effect of allowing an EV to discharge on the
optimal social welfare by changing the resource capacity
[hi]j of the EV’s discharging constraint. Since all individual
constraints can be described by the general linear constraint
(6), we can perform the sensitivity analysis by analyzing the
dual variable (shadow price) associated with the constraint
(6) of problem (D). This is what we call General Sensitivity
Analysis Approach, GSAA.
In the following sections, we study GSAA in two dif-
ferent net utility function settings: quadratic and general
convex. In the former case, the closed-form shadow price
can be derived; while in the later case, the shadow price may
not be derived explicitly. Instead, we analyze properties of
the bounds on the shadow price.
4 QUADRATIC SETTINGS
In this section, we consider a setting, where all the net
utility functions (Ui − Ci) ,∀i ∈ N+ are quadratic. Then
GSAA can provide a closed-form shadow price reflecting
quantitative information about impacts of the general linear
constraints on the optimal objective value, i.e., maximal
social welfare.
4.1 Model Reformulation in Quadratic Settings
In the quadratic setting, the models of prosumers, the utility
company and DSO can be reformulated into the following
forms.
4.1.1 Prosumer
The net utility function of prosumer i using appliance a at
time t by consuming quantity x is given below,
U ti,a (x)− Cti,a (x) = aˆi,a (t)x2 + bˆi,a (t)x+ cˆi,a (t) , (7)
where the second order coefficient aˆi,a (t) < 0 represents
the concavity of the appliance’s net utility. The first order
coefficient bˆi,a (t) represents the appliance’s initial utility
increasing rate, i.e., the utility associated with consuming
the first unit of energy. The constant cˆi,a (t) represents the
initial utility when time period t starts. For different types
of appliances, their quadratic net utility coefficients are
described in Table 1. More details on the coefficient meaning
of different appliances can be found in [31].
TABLE 1: Signs of Quadratic Net Utility Coefficients
Inflexible Appliances aˆi,a (t) < 0, bˆi,a (t) > 0, cˆi,a (t) = 0
Flexible
ACs, Washers aˆi,a (t) < 0, bˆi,a (t) > 0
EVs/PHEVs aˆi,a (t) < 0, bˆi,a (t) > 0, cˆi,a (t) = 0
Energy Storage aˆi,a (t) < 0, bˆi,a (t) = 0, cˆi,a (t) = 0
In the above table, in addition to ACs and washers,
dryers, dishwashers and fridges also belong to the first
category under flexible appliances.
With these quadratic coefficients, we can reformulate
prosumer problem (P) into the following matrix form,
max
qDi
1
2
(
qDi
)T
Λi qDi + (bi − pi)T qDi + cTi 1i, s.t. (P2), (8)
where matrix Λi = diag
(
Λi,1,Λi,2, ...,Λi,|Ai|
)
with Λi,a =
diag (2aˆi,a (1) , 2aˆi,a (2) , ..., 2aˆi,a (H)) for a ∈ Ai, vector
bi = (bi,a,∀a ∈ Ai) with bi,a =
(
bˆi,a (t) ,∀t ∈ H
)
, vector
pi = (p,∀a ∈ Ai), vector ci = (ci,a,∀a ∈ Ai) with ci,a =
(cˆi,a (t) ,∀t ∈ H), and vector 1i = ((1,∀t ∈ H) ,∀a ∈ Ai).
4.1.2 Electric Utility Company
For simplicity, we assume the utility company’s production
cost is linear and can be time-varying, i.e., for qS ∈ RH ,
C0
(
qS
)
= bT0 q
S , where b0 ∈ RH+ . (9)
64.1.3 DSO
Under the quadratic framework and by using equation (D3)
to substitute decision variable qS with qD, the DSO prob-
lem (D) can be reformulated into the following quadratic
programming problem,
max
qD
1
2
(
qD
)T
Λ qD + b¯TqD + gT1 s.t. (D2), (10)
where matrix Λ = diag (Λ1,Λ2, ...,ΛN ), vectors b¯ =
((bi,a − b0,∀a ∈ Ai) ,∀i ∈ N+), g = (ci,∀i ∈ N+) and
1 = (1i,∀i ∈ N+). Matrix Λ is a full rank diagonal
H
∑
i∈N+ |Ai| by H
∑
i∈N+ |Ai| matrix.
4.2 Shadow Price in Quadratic Settings
In this section, we derive a closed-form expression of the
shadow price, i.e., the Lagrange multiplier/the dual vari-
able associated to the jth general linear constraint for pro-
sumer i, (6), in the reformulated DSO problem (10). Let λ
denote the Lagrange multiplier vector to constraint set (D2).
First, we show an important property of the problem (10)
used in deriving the shadow price later.
Property 4.1. The reformulated DSO problem (10) is equivalent
to the following N problems: ∀i ∈ N+,
max
qDi
1
2
(
qDi
)T
Λi qDi + b¯
T
i q
D
i + c
T
i 1i, s.t. (P2), (11)
where b¯i = (bi,a − b0,∀a ∈ Ai). By equivalent, we mean they
have the same optimal primal solutions and the same optimal dual
solutions. (Problem (11) is the same as the reformulated prosumer
problems (8) with pi = b0, for all i ∈ N+.)
Proof. Notice that the objective function of problem (10)
is equal to
∑
i∈N+
[
1
2
(
qDi
)T
Λi qDi + b¯
T
i q
D
i + c
T
i 1i
]
, where
b¯i = (bi,a − b0,∀a ∈ Ai), and in (D2), the constraints
corresponding to one prosumer is independent from the
constraints corresponding to the other prosumers. Hence,
the KKT conditions for the original problem (10) are the
same as the combination of KKT conditions of all decoupled
problems (11) (One can refer to the KKT conditions used
in Theorem 3.1’s proof). Hence, by strong duality of both
problems (10) and (11) for all i ∈ N+, their optimal primal
and dual solutions are the same to each other.
The above property tells us, deriving the shadow price
for the DSO problem (10) is equivalent to deriving the
shadow price for the decoupled problems (11). Furthermore,
the shadow price of the decoupled problems (11) can be di-
rectly applied to sensitivity analysis to the original problem
(10).
Now, we can first focus on the decoupled problem (11)
for prosumer i. Let λi denote the optimal dual variable as-
sociated with constraint (P2). Since the matrix Λi is diagonal
and of full rank, by first order condition we can write the
optimal solution qD∗i for problem (11) as
qD∗i = −Λ−1i
(
b¯Ti −ATi λi
)
. (12)
Substituting (12) to (11) and by strong duality, the quadratic
programming problem (11) is equivalent to its dual problem
as below,
max
λi≥0
1
2
λTi AiΛ
−1
i A
T
i λi − λTi
(
AiΛ
−1
i b¯
T
i + hi
)
, (13)
where we ignore the constant term cTi 1i, since it does not
affect the optimal solution.
For the above dual problem (13), to the best of our
knowledge, there is no explicit closed-form solution. How-
ever, for this paper, we are interested in estimating the effect
of changing one of prosumer i’s resource capacities, [hi]j , at
a time on the social welfare. Hence, we only need to focus
on one element of Lagrange multiplier vector λi.
We do so by focusing on the targeted constraint i.e., the
jth general linear constraint for prosumer i, (6), and assume
this constraint is tight at optimality while prosumer i’s other
constraints are not (Note, there is no assumption about the
other prosumers’ constraints). Then derive the shadow price
[λ∗i ]j associated with the constraint (6). Due to complimen-
tary slackness, we know for prosumer i, [λ∗i ]l = 0,∀l 6= j.
By matrix calculations, we can obtain the shadow price [λ∗i ]j
of the target constraint (6) as below,
[λ∗i ]j =
[[
AiΛ
−1
i b¯i + hi
]
j[
AiΛ
−1
i A
T
i
]
jj
]+
. (14)
By the definitions of A and Λ, we have
[λ∗i ]j =

∑
a∈A(j)i
∑
t∈H(j)i,a
α
(j)
i,a(t)[bˆi,a(t)−b0(t)]
2aˆi,a(t)
+ [hi]j∑
a∈A(j)i
∑
t∈H(j)i,a
[
α
(j)
i,a(t)
]2
2aˆi,a(t)

+
.
(15)
Based on property 4.1, we know the above closed-form
shadow price (15) reflects the rate of change in social welfare
(objective function value of (D)) associated with change of
the resource capacity [hi]j . More specifically, the amount of
social welfare improvement associated with increasing the
resource capacity by up to K units, i.e., relaxing the general
linear constraint (6) to
∑
a∈A(j)i
∑
t∈H(j)i,a
α
(j)
i,a (t)q
D
i,a (t) ≤
[hi]j +K , is upper bounded by K [λ∗i ]j . Hence, the closed-
form shadow price (15) can be used as a measuring tool
for GSAA to quickly estimate the potential of prosumer i’s
contribution on social welfare with change of the resource
capacity in DR. When one needs to encourage/select cus-
tomers to participate in DR or make investment on network
construction or upgrade to enable certain DR functions, pri-
ority should be given to the prosumer with a larger potential
contribution i.e., a larger value of Kλ∗AC (especially when
there is a limited budget for the campaign, infrastructure
upgrade or management).
4.3 GSAA Applications in Quadratic Settings
To show how GSAA can be used to identify contribution
potentials of different prosumers on social welfare with
change of their resource capacities in DR, we provide three
application examples here: enlarging AC comfort zone, al-
lowing net-selling behavior and allowing EVs to discharge.
74.3.1 GSAA for Enlarging AC Comfort Zone
For prosumer i using an AC (labeled by AC) at time period
t, the AC comfort zone constraint (refer to [9] and [30]) can
be represented by
QD
i,AC
≤
t∑
τ=1
αi,AC (τ) q
D
i,AC (τ) ≤ Q
D
i,AC , (16)
where, αi,AC (τ) < 0. Values Q
D
i,AC
and Q
D
i,AC reflect
prosumer i’s equivalent lowest and highest comfort tem-
peratures respectively. Due to symmetry, here we only take
the right inequality of (16) as an example. It can be refor-
mulated as the jth general linear constraint for prosumer i,
of form Eq. (6), where A(j)i = {AC}, H(j)i,a = {1, 2, ..., t},
α
(j)
i,a (t) = αi,a (t) and [hi]j = Q
D
i,AC . We use λ
∗
AC to
denote the optimal dual variable, i.e., the shadow price,
corresponding to this constraint. By using GSAA, i.e., sub-
stituting specific parameters of the constraint and the net
utility function (7) into (15), we can obtain the shadow price
for relaxing AC comfort zone’s upper limit as
λ∗AC =
∑tτ=1 αi,AC(τ)(bˆi,AC(τ)−b0(τ))aˆi,AC(τ) + 2QDi,AC∑t
τ=1
α2i,AC(τ)
aˆi,AC(τ)

+
. (17)
Then Kλ∗AC shows the potential of prosumer i’s contri-
bution on social welfare by enlarging his/her AC comfort
zone limit Q
D
i,AC by K units. From the form of (17), we can
observe that for two prosumers with similar utility functions
and similar AC parameters (αi,AC (τ)), the one who accepts
a higher temperature, reflected as larger Q
D
i,AC , has a lower
contribution potential on social welfare. This result suggests
that we should target those prefer cold AC setpoints first.
4.3.2 GSAA for Allowing Net Selling
For prosumer i, who is also a net buyer, we can use GSAA to
estimate his/her contribution on social welfare by allowing
him/her to be a net seller in DR, i.e., relaxing the net buying
constraint (5). This constraint can be reformulated as the
jth general linear constraint for prosumer i, of form Eq. (6),
where A(j)i = Ai, H(j)i,a = {t}, α(j)i,a = −1 and [hi]j = 0. We
use λ∗NS to denote the optimal dual variable corresponding
to this constraint. By using GSAA, i.e., substituting specific
parameters of the constraint and the net utility function (7)
into (15), we can obtain the shadow price for allowing a
prosumer to be a net seller as
λ∗NS =
∑a∈Ai b0(t)−bˆi,a(t)aˆi,a(t)∑
a∈Ai
1
aˆi,a(t)
+ . (18)
Then Kλ∗NS shows the potential of the net buyer i’s contri-
bution on social welfare in DR by allowing him/her to net
sell energy up to K units. From the form of (18), we can
find that the effect of allowing net selling on social welfare
improvement is not due to a single appliance. Instead, it is
affected by a combination of all appliances, which implies
the high complexity of accurate sensitivity analysis. If there
is one appliance, whose net utility function is much flatter
(very price-responsive) than the rest, i.e., there exists an a1
with aˆi,a1 (t) >> aˆi,a2 (t) , ..., aˆi,a|Ai| (t), and if all appli-
ance initial utility increasing rates bˆi,a1 (t) , ..., bˆi,a|Ai| (t) are
similar, then λ∗NS =
[
b0(t)− bˆi,a1(t)
]+
. Hence, the shadow
price is dominated by this most price-responsive appliance.
4.3.3 GSAA for Allowing EVs to Discharge
By using GSAA, we can also estimate the effect of allowing
prosumer i’s EV (labeled byEV ) to discharge at time period
t, i.e., relaxing the constraint qDi,a (t) ≥ 0, on the social
welfare improvement. Similarly, the above constraint can be
reformulated as the jth general linear constraint for pro-
sumer i, of form Eq. (6), where A(j)i = {EV }, H(j)i,a = {t},
α
(j)
i,a = −1 and [hi]j = 0. We use λ∗EV to denote the optimal
dual variable associated to this constraint. Substituting spe-
cific parameters of the constraint and the net utility function
(7) into (15), we can obtain the shadow price for allowing
EVs to discharge is
λ∗EV =
[
b0 (t)− bˆi,EV (t)
]+
. (19)
Similarly, if we allow the EV to discharge up to K units of
energy, then the potential of prosumer i’s contribution on
social welfare is Kλ∗EV . We can see that the above shadow
price is monotonically increasing in the current utility com-
pany’s production cost and monotonically decreasing in
bˆi,EV . Hence those with low values of bˆi,EV , who value EV
charging less, should be given EV discharging capacity first.
5 GENERAL CONVEX SETTINGS
In this section, we study GSAA under a more general
framework, where we do not have an explicit form of a
prosumer’s net utility function except for some nice convex-
ity, by which we mean the prosumer’s negative net utility
function is strongly convex and has Lipschitz continuous
gradient. It’s worth mentioning that the quadratic settings
discussed in the previous section is just a special case of
general convex settings here. Under the general convex
settings, even though we cannot get a closed-form shadow
price, we are able to derive upper and lower bounds of
shadow prices based on the quadratic settings before. These
bounds, as indirect information, can still provide us insights
on prosumers’ marginal contributions on social welfare as
they change resources capacity in DR.
5.1 Preliminary
We first introduce basic definitions and equivalent condi-
tions for strong convexity and Lipschitz continuous gradient
[33], [35], which are used in theorems appeared latter.
Definition 3 (Strong Convexity). A function f : Rn → R is
µ-strongly convex (or has µ-strong convexity) for µ > 0, if the
function f(x)− µ2 ‖x‖2 is convex for all x ∈ Rn.
Lemma 5.1. A differentiable function f : Rn → R is µ-strongly
convex if and only if ∀x, y ∈ Rn,
f(x) ≥ f(y) +∇f(y)T (x− y) + µ
2
‖x− y‖2. (20)
Lemma 5.2. If a function f : Rn → R is µ-strongly convex,
then f is strictly convex. [36]
8Definition 4 (Lipschitz Continuous Gradient). A differen-
tiable continuous function f : Rn → R has L-Lipschitz continu-
ous gradient for L > 0, if ‖∇f(x)−∇f(y)‖ ≤ L‖x− y‖ for all
x, y ∈ Rn.
Lemma 5.3. A convex function f : Rn → R has L-Lipschitz
continuous gradient if and only if ∀x, y ∈ Rn,
f(x) ≤ f(y) +∇f(y)T (x− y) + L
2
‖x− y‖2 (21)
5.2 Model Reformulation in General Convex Settings
For notational convenience, we let Fi(qDi ) = −
[
Ui
(
qDi
)
−Ci
(
qDi
)]
. In the general convex framework, all pro-
sumers’ net utility functions have nice convexity. Specifi-
cally, we adopt the following assumption:
Assumption 5. Fi(qDi ) is differentiable, µi-strongly convex and
has Li-Lipschitz continuous gradient, ∀i ∈ N+.
With notation Fi(qDi ), we can write DSO problem (D) as
min
qD,qS
∑
i∈N+
Fi(qDi ) + C0
(
qS
)
s.t. (D2) and (D3).
For simplicity, we still adopt the assumption that the
utility company’s cost function C0
(
qS
)
has linear form as
in Eq. (9). By substituting Eq. (9) and Eq. (D3) into the above
DSO problem (D), we can simplify it to
min
qD
∑
i∈N+
Fi(qDi ) +
∑
i∈N+
∑
a∈Ai
bT0 q
D
i,a s.t. (D2). (22)
Let F
(
qD
)
denote the objective function in (22), then by
Assumption 5, Lemma 5.1 and 5.3 for each Fi(qDi ) and sum-
ming over all i ∈ N+, we have: ∀qD, r, r ∈ RH
∑
i∈N+ |Ai|,
F (r,qD) ≤ F (qD) ≤ F (r,qD), (23)
where
F (r,qD) =
∑
i∈N+
F i(ri,q
D
i ) +
∑
i∈N+
∑
a∈Ai
bT0 q
D
i,a, r = (ri,∀i) ,
F (r,qD) =
∑
i∈N+
F i(ri,qDi ) +
∑
i∈N+
∑
a∈Ai
bT0 q
D
i,a, r = (ri,∀i) ,
F i(ri,q
D
i ) = Fi(ri) +∇Fi(ri)T (qDi − ri) +
µi
2
‖qDi − ri‖2,
F i(ri,qDi ) = Fi(ri) +∇Fi(ri)T (qDi − ri) +
Li
2
‖qDi − ri‖2.
5.3 Shadow Price in General Convex Settings
In this section we derive closed-form upper and lower
bounds of shadow price, i.e., Lagrange multiplier associated
with any general linear constraint (6), from the following
three problems.
min
qD
F (r,qD) s.t. (D2), (I)
min
qD
F
(
qD
)
s.t. (D2), (II)
min
qD
F (r,qD) s.t. (D2), (III)
where the problem (II) is the problem (22) with a simplified
form. Some basic properties of the problems (I), (II) and (III)
are given below.
Property 5.1. For any given r and r (‖r‖, ‖r‖ < ∞), each
problem of (I), (II) and (III) has unique primal and dual optimal
solutions.
Proof. Given any r and r (‖r‖, ‖r‖ <∞), by a similar process
of proof of Theorem 3.1, the dual optimal solutions for
(I), (II) and (III) exist. Next, since Fi
(
qDi
)
is µi-strongly
convex, by Lemma 5.1, we know Fi
(
qDi
)
is strictly convex.
Since F
(
qD
)
is the summation of strictly convex functions
and convex functions, it is strictly convex too. Similarly,
because F (r,qD) and F (r,qD) are summations of quadratic
functions (strictly convex) and a linear function (convex),
they are also stricly convex for any r∗ and r∗. Hence, due
to the strict convexity, by Section 5.5.5 of [33], we know
both primal and dual optimal solutions are unique for each
problem.
Property 5.2. The optimal objective values F ∗, F ∗, F
∗
of the
problems (I), (II), (III) satisfy F ∗ ≤ F ∗ ≤ F ∗ for any given r
and r.
Proof. This holds due to Eq. (23).
With the above property, we can denote these unique pri-
mal and dual optimal solution pairs for problems (I), (II) and
(III) by
(
qD∗,λ∗
)
,
(
qD∗,λ∗
)
and
(
qD∗,λ
∗)
respectively. A
relationship between the optimal solutions of these three
problems are described in the following theorem.
Property 5.3. There exist vectors r∗ and r∗, such that optimiza-
tion problems (I), (II) and (III) have the same optimal solution i.e.,
qD∗ = qD∗ = qD∗.
Proof. We first show by construction that there exists a vec-
tor r∗ such that problem (I) and (II) have the same optimal
solution i.e., qD∗ = qD∗. Firstly, we solve problem (I) with
r = qD∗. By definition of F (r,qD), the objective function of
problem (I) becomes
F
(
qD∗,qD
)
=
∑
i∈N+
µi
2
‖qDi − qD∗i ‖2 +
∑
i∈N+
∑
a∈Ai
bT0 q
D
i,a
+
∑
i∈N+
Fi(qD∗i ) +
∑
i∈N+
∇Fi(qD∗i )T (qDi − qD∗i ). (24)
Organizing the above equation in terms of the order of
decision variable qD , we have
F
(
qD∗,qD
)
=
1
2
∑
i∈N+
µi
(
qDi
)T
qDi +
∑
i∈N+
∑
a∈Ai
bT0 q
D
i,a
−
∑
i∈N+
[
µiqD∗i −∇Fi
(
qD∗i
)]T
qDi +
∑
i∈N+
[
Fi(qD∗i )
−∇Fi
(
qD∗i
)T
qD∗i +
µi
2
‖qD∗i ‖2
]
, (25)
where the last summation term is a constant. Hence, KKT
conditions for the problem (I) with r = qD∗ are as below,
λ∗ ≥ 0, (I.1)
AqD∗ − h ≤ 0, (I.2)
diag
{
λ∗
(
AqD∗ − h
)T}
= 0, (I.3)
MqD∗ −
[
MqD∗ −∇F
(
qD∗
)]
+ATλ∗ = 0, (I.4)
9where M = diag (µ1I1, µ2I2, ..., µN IN ). Ii is an identity ma-
trix with length H|Ai|. If we replace (qD∗,λ∗) by (qD∗,λ∗)
in the above KKT conditions for the problem (I), then we
can obtain the following expressions
λ∗ ≥ 0, (II.1)
AqD∗ − h ≤ 0, (II.2)
diag
{
λ∗
(
AqD∗ − h
)T}
= 0, (II.3)
∇F (qD∗) +ATλ∗ = 0. (II.4)
These expressions hold due to optimality of (qD∗,λ∗) as
they are exactly the same as KKT conditions for problem (II).
Hence, qD∗ also satisfies (I.1)-(I.4) and is an optimal solution
of the problem (I). With Theorem 5.1, we know qD∗ = qD∗.
By a similar process, we can prove for r∗ = qD∗, (II) and
(III) have the same optimal solution, i.e., qD∗ = qD∗. 3
Property 5.4. The problems (I), (II) and (III) are equivalent to
the following three decoupled problems respectively, i.e., each of
problems (I), (II) and (III) has the same primal and dual optimal
solutions to its decoupled problem.
min
qDi
Gi(ri, q
D
i ) s.t. (P2), ∀i ∈ N+, (De-I)
min
qDi
Gi
(
qDi
)
s.t. (P2), ∀i ∈ N+, (De-II)
min
qDi
Gi(ri, qDi ) s.t. (P2), ∀i ∈ N+, (De-III)
where Gi(ri, q
D
i ) = F i(ri, q
D
i ) +
∑
a∈Ai b
T
0 q
D
i,a, Gi(q
D
i ) =
Fi(qDi ) +
∑
a∈Ai b
T
0 q
D
i,a and Gi(ri, q
D
i ) = F i(ri, q
D
i ) +∑
a∈Ai b
T
0 q
D
i,a.
Proof. Due to Eq. (23), we know the problems (I), (II) and
(III) are summations of problems (De-I), (De-II) and (De-III)
over i ∈ N+ respectively. And because different prosumers’
constraints are separable, following the similar procedure
to prove property 4.1 in section 4.2, we can obtain original
problems and their decoupled problems are equivalent.
Based on the above properties, we know the shadow
price for the decoupled problems (De-II) can be directly
applied to sensitivity analysis for the DSO problem (10).
Hence, we can first analyze the decoupled problems. Let
λi, λi and λi denote the optimal dual variable associated
with constraint (P2) in problems (De-I), (De-II) and (De-III)
for prosumer i. Similar to the quadratic settings, we only
focus on the targeted constraint i.e., the jth general linear
constraint for prosumer i, (6), and assume this constraint
is tight at optimality while prosumer i’s other constraints
are not (Similarly, there is no assumption about the other
prosumers’ constraints). Then derive the closed-form upper
and lower bounds of the shadow price, as shown below.
Theorem 5.1 (Dual Bounding Theorem). Assume for certain
given rk and rk, prosumer k’s optimization problems (De-I), (De-
II) and (De-III) achieve optimality with only the jth constraint of
(P2), i.e.,
∑
a∈A(j)k
∑
t∈H(j)k,a
α
(j)
k,a (t) q
D
k,a (t) ≤ [hi]j being tight.
We denote the corresponding dual variables (i.e., shadow prices)
3. It’s worth mentioning that the proof only shows existence, but not
provide information about uniqueness of such existence.
as [λ∗k]j , [λ
∗
k]j and [λ
∗
k]j respectively. Then, (1) [λ
∗
k]j is bounded
by the following inequalities,
max{[λ∗k]j −Hk,1, [λ
∗
k]j −Hk,3, 0} ≤ [λ∗k]j
≤ min{[λ∗k]j +Hk,1, [λ
∗
k]j +Hk,3}, (26)
in which
[λ∗k]j = ηk
[ ∑
a∈A(j)k
∑
t∈H(j)k,a
α
(j)
k,a (t)
[
µkrk,a(t)
− ∂Fk
∂qk,a(t)
(
rk,a(t)
)− b0(t)]− µk[hi]j
]+
, (27)
[λ
∗
k]j = ηk
[ ∑
a∈A(j)k
∑
t∈H(j)k,a
α
(j)
k,a (t)
[
Lkrk,a(t)
− ∂Fk
∂qk,a(t)
(rk,a(t))− b0(t)
]
− Lk[hi]j
]+
, (28)
Hk,1 =
√
ηk
[
µk‖qD∗k ‖+ Lk‖q
D∗
k ‖+ (µk + Lk) ‖rk‖
]
,
(29)
Hk,3 =
√
ηkLk
(
‖qD∗k ‖+ ‖qD∗k ‖+ 2‖rk‖
)
, (30)
ηk =
{ ∑
a∈A(j)k
∑
t∈H(j)k,a
[
α
(j)
k,a(t)
]2 }−1
; (31)
(2) if r∗k and r
∗
k are vectors such that q
D∗
k
= qD∗k = q
D∗
k , then the
form of Eq. (26) can be represented with Hk,1 and Hk,3 changed
to
Hk,1 =
√
ηk(Lk + µk)(‖qD∗k ‖+ ‖r∗k‖), (32)
Hk,3 = 2
√
ηkLk(‖qD∗k ‖+ ‖r∗k‖). (33)
Proof. (1) By first order optimality conditions of (De-I), (De-
II) and (De-III), we have
µkqD∗k − µkrk +∇Gk(rk) +A
T
k λ
∗
k = 0, (34)
∇Gk(qD∗k ) +ATk λ∗k = 0, (35)
LkqD∗k − Lkrk +∇Gk(rk) +ATk λ
∗
k = 0. (36)
Subtracting Eq. (35) from Eq. (34) and Eq. (36) respec-
tively, we obtain
ATk (λ
∗
k − λ∗k) =∇Fk(qD∗k )−∇Fk(rk)− µkqD∗k + µkrk,
(37)
ATk (λ
∗
k − λ∗k) =∇Fk(qD∗k )−∇Fk(rk)− LkqD∗k + Lkrk.
(38)
By using triangle inequality and definition 4 we have
‖ATk (λ∗k − λ∗k)‖ ≤ ‖∇Fk(qD∗k )−∇Fk(rk)‖+ ‖µkqD∗k ‖
+ ‖µkrk‖ ≤ Lk‖qD∗k − rk‖+ µk‖qD∗k ‖+ µk‖rk‖
≤ µk‖qD∗k ‖+ Lk‖q
D∗
k ‖+ (µk + Lk)‖rk‖,
‖ATk (λ
∗
k − λ∗k)‖ ≤ ‖∇Fk(qD∗k )−∇Fk(rk)‖+ ‖LkqD∗k ‖
+ ‖Lkrk‖ ≤ Lk‖qD∗k − rk‖+ Lk‖qD∗k ‖+ Lk‖rk‖
≤ Lk
(
‖qD∗k ‖+ ‖qD∗k ‖+ 2‖rk‖
)
.
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Since problems (De-I), (De-II) and (De-III) achieve optimal-
ity with the same jth constraint tight, by complimentary
slackness conditions we have
[λ∗k]l = [λ
∗
k]l = [λ
∗
k]l = 0,∀l 6= j, (39)
The above three relations imply
‖ATk (λ∗k − λ∗k)‖ =
∣∣∣[λ∗k]j − [λ∗k]j∣∣∣
√√√√ ∑
a∈A(j)k
∑
t∈H(j)k,a
[
α
(j)
k,a(t)
]2
≤ µk‖qD∗k ‖+ Lk‖q
D∗
k ‖+ (µk + Lk)‖rk‖, (40)
‖ATk (λ
∗
k − λ∗k)‖ =
∣∣∣[λ∗k]j − [λ∗k]j∣∣∣
√√√√ ∑
a∈A(j)k
∑
t∈H(j)k,a
[
α
(j)
k,a(t)
]2
≤ Lk
(
‖qD∗k ‖+ ‖qD∗k ‖+ 2‖rk‖
)
. (41)
Multiplying ηk on both sides of the above two inequalities,
we have∣∣∣[λ∗k]j − [λ∗k]j∣∣∣ ≤√ηk [µk‖qD∗k ‖+ Lk‖qD∗k ‖
+ (µk + Lk) ‖rk‖] ,∣∣∣[λ∗k]j − [λ∗k]j∣∣∣ ≤√ηkLk (‖qD∗k ‖+ ‖qD∗k ‖+ 2‖rk‖) .
Because [λ∗k]j ≥ 0 and definitions of Hk,1 and Hk,3, we
obtain Eq. (26).
Next, we prove equations (27) and (28) hold. Due to sim-
ilarity, here we only provide the proof of (27). We know
[λ∗k]j is the shadow price associated with the j
th general
linear constraint in optimization problem (De-I). Note that
the objective function of problem (De-I), Gk(rk,q
D
k ) has
quadratic form in terms of qDk , as shown below.
Gk(rk,q
D
k ) =
µk
2
(
qDk
)T
qDk +
[
∇F (rk) + b˜0 −Mrk
]T
qDk
+
[
Fk(rk)−∇Fk(rk)T rk +
µk
2
‖rk‖2
]
, (42)
where b˜0 = (b0,∀a ∈ Ak). Following the similar procedure
to derive (15) in section 4.1.3, we have the shadow price
[λ∗k]j for problem (I) as below.
[λ∗k]j =

∑
a∈A(j)k
∑
t∈H(j)k,a
α
(j)
k,a(t)pik,a(t)
−µk + [hi]j∑
a∈A(j)k
∑
t∈H(j)k,a
[
α
(j)
k,a(t)
]2
−µk

+
, (43)
where pik,a(t) = µkrk,a(t)− ∂Fk∂qk,a(t)
(
rk,a(t)
)− b0(t). Multi-
plying −µk on both of the numerator and the denominator
in the right hand side of equality (43), we obtain
[λ∗k]j = ηk
[ ∑
a∈A(j)k
∑
t∈H(j)k,a
α
(j)
k,a(t)pik,a(t)− µk[hi]j
]+
,
which is equivalent to (27).
(2) By property 5.3, we can substitute qD∗k = q
D∗
k
, rk = r
∗
k
into Eq. (29) and qD∗k = q
D∗
k , rk = r
∗
k into Eq. (30). Then we
obtain (32) and (33). This completes the proof.
Based on the above theorem, we can substitute different
values of rk and rk to obtain various bounds of the shadow
price [λ∗k]j . The pair r
∗
k = q
D∗
k and r
∗
k = q
D∗
k would
give us the exact bounds, but cannot provide us too much
information due to terms cancelation. Another candidate is
rk = r¯k = 0, by which we can obtain the following simpler
upper and lower bounds of the shadow price [λ∗k]j . For the
rest of the paper, we use qD∗
k
and qD∗k to denote the optimal
solutions with rk = r¯k = 0.
Corollary 5.1. In Theorem 5.1 (1), if rk = r¯k = 0, then the lower
bound of [λ∗k]j , denoted by [λ
∗
k]
lower
j , could be further simplified
as
max
{
ηk
[ ∑
a∈A(j)k
∑
t∈H(j)k,a
α
(j)
k,a(t)
[
− ∂Fk
∂qk,a(t)
(0)− b0(t)
]
− µk[hk]j
]+
−√ηk
(
µk‖qD∗k ‖+ Lk‖q
D∗
k ‖
)
,
ηk
[ ∑
a∈A(j)k
∑
t∈H(j)k,a
α
(j)
k,a(t)
[
− ∂Fk
∂qk,a(t)
(0)− b0(t)
]
− Lk[hk]j
]+
−√ηkLk
(
‖qD∗k ‖+ ‖qD∗k ‖
)
, 0
}
;
(44)
the upper bound [λ∗k]
upper
j of [λ
∗
k]j could be simplified as
min
{
ηk
[ ∑
a∈A(j)k
∑
t∈H(j)k,a
α
(j)
k,a(t)
[
− ∂Fk
∂qk,a(t)
(0)− b0(t)
]
− µk[hk]j
]+
+
√
ηk
(
µk‖qD∗k ‖+ Lk‖q
D∗
k ‖
)
,
ηk
[ ∑
a∈A(j)k
∑
t∈H(j)k,a
α
(j)
k,a(t)
[
− ∂Fk
∂qk,a(t)
(0)− b0(t)
]
− Lk[hk]j
]+
+
√
ηkLk
(
‖qD∗k ‖+ ‖qD∗k ‖
)}
. (45)
We notice that the bounds are related to prosumer k’s
initial utility increasing rate − ∂Fk∂qk,a(t) (0), which is positive
by Assumption 2.
Corollary 5.2. In theorem 5.1 (1), if rk = r¯k = 0 and [hk]j = 0,
then we can further simplify the bounds in Corollary 5.1, where
the lower bound [λ∗k]
lower
j of [λ
∗
k]j becomesηk
[ ∑
a∈A(j)k
∑
t∈H(j)k,a
α
(j)
k,a(t)
[
− ∂Fk
∂qk,a(t)
(0)− b0(t)
] ]+
−√ηkLk
(
‖qD∗k ‖+ ‖qD∗k ‖
)]+
; (46)
the upper bound [λ∗k]
upper
j of [λ
∗
k]j becomes
ηk
[ ∑
a∈A(j)k
∑
t∈H(j)k,a
α
(j)
k,a(t)
[
− ∂Fk
∂qk,a(t)
(0)− b0(t)
] ]+
+
√
ηkLk
(
‖qD∗k ‖+ ‖qD∗k ‖
)
. (47)
Proof. By observing Eq. (37) and Eq. (38) and specifying r =
11
r = 0, we can obtain
µkqD∗k = ∇Fk(q
D∗
k )−∇Fk(0)−ATk (λ∗k − λ∗k),
LkqD∗k = ∇Fk(qD∗k )−∇Fk(0)−ATk (λ
∗
k − λ∗k).
Substituting rk = rk = 0 and [hk]j = 0 into (27) and
(28), we can have [λ∗k]j = [λ
∗
k]j . Combining with (39), we
obtain λ∗k = λ
∗
k, which leads to µkq
D∗
k
= LkqD∗k and thus
µk‖qD∗k ‖ = Lk‖q
D∗
k ‖. By directly substituting this equation
and [hk]j = 0 into Eq. (44) and Eq. (45), we can obtain (46)
and (47).
In the general convex settings, the closed-form upper
and lower bounds of the shadow price in the above Dual
Bounding Theorem 5.1, its Corollaries 5.1 and 5.2, and
Property 5.4 provide foundations for GSAA, which can be
used as a measuring tool to estimate the ranges of prosumer
k’s contribution potential on social welfare with change
of the resource capacity in DR. More specifically, inter-
val
[
K [λ∗k]
lower
j ,K [λ
∗
k]
upper
j
]
shows the potential range of
prosumer k’s contribution on social welfare by increasing
his/her resource capacity [hk]j by K units. Similar to the
quadratic setting, we next answer the question of which pro-
sumer should be allocated the additional resource capacity
to maximize the improvement in social welfare, when there
is a limited budget in expanding resource capacity. We do so
by comparing these potential ranges. When one’s potential
range is strictly higher than the other’s, then that prosume
should get priority. In case there is overlap, then the result
may be indecisive. In such case, further analysis is required.
5.4 GSAA Applications in General Convex Settings
Similar to section 4.3, here we provide three application
examples: enlarging AC comfort zone, allowing net-selling
behavior and allowing EVs to discharge. However, different
from section 4.3, in general convex settings GSAA only gives
us closed-form upper and lower bounds of the shadow price
instead of the closed-form shadow price itself. Nevertheless,
under certain conditions, we can identify the prosumer with
most significant impact on social welfare based on these
bounds.
5.4.1 GSAA for Enlarging AC Comfort Zone
Prosumer k’s AC (labeled by AC) comfort zone constraint
is given by (16). Take the right inequality of (16), i.e., the
upper limit constraint, as an example. Similar to Section
4.3.1, we can reformulate it into the jth general linear
constraint for prosumer k. By using GSAA, i.e., substituting
specific parameters of the constraint into Corollary 5.1, we
can obtain upper and lower bounds of the shadow price for
increasing AC comfort zone’s upper limit, where the lower
bound λ∗AC of the shadow price λ
∗
AC is
max
{
ηk
[
t∑
τ=1
αk,AC(τ)
(
− ∂Fk
∂qk,AC(τ)
(0)− b0(τ)
)
− µkQDk,AC
]+
−√ηk
(
µk‖qD∗k ‖+ Lk‖q
D∗
k ‖
)
,
ηk
[
t∑
τ=1
αk,AC(τ)
(
− ∂Fk
∂qk,AC(τ)
(0)− b0(τ)
)
− LkQDk,AC
]+
−√ηkLk
(
‖qD∗k ‖+ ‖qD∗k ‖
)
, 0
}
,
where ηk =
[∑t
τ=1 α
2
k,AC(τ)
]−1
; the upper bound λ
∗
AC of
the shadow price is
min
{
ηk
[
t∑
τ=1
αk,AC(τ)
(
− ∂Fk
∂qk,AC(τ)
(0)− b0(τ)
)
− µkQDk,AC
]+
+
√
ηk
(
µk‖qD∗k ‖+ Lk‖q
D∗
k ‖
)
,
ηk
[
t∑
τ=1
αk,AC(τ)
(
− ∂Fk
∂qk,AC(τ)
(0)− b0(τ)
)
− LkQDk,AC
]+
+
√
ηkLk
(
‖qD∗k ‖+ ‖qD∗k ‖
)}
.
We note that unlike (17) in the quadratic settings, the
above bounds do not need information about the specific
forms or coefficients of the net utility function. Instead,
it requires several key values to complete the calculation,
the initial utility increasing rate − ∂Fk∂qk,AC(τ) (0), the optimal
solutions of problems (I) and (III), i.e., qD∗
k
and qD∗k , and the
operating point qD∗k
4.
For two prosumers with similar utility functions and
similar AC parameters (αi,AC (τ)), everything else equal,
the one accepts a higher temperature, reflected as larger
Q
D
i,AC , has a relatively lower range of contribution potential,
just as in Section 4.3.1. However, in this case, it is harder
to guarantee all other parameters are equal, as the ranges
depends on qD∗k and q
D∗
k
.
5.4.2 GSAA for Allowing Net Selling
Allowing prosumer k (a net buyer) to be a net-seller in DR
is equivalent to relaxing the net buying constraint (5), which
can be reformulated as the jth general linear constraint
for prosumer k (similar to Section 4.3.2). By using GSAA
i.e., substituting specific parameters of the constraint to
Corollary 5.2, we can obtain the lower bound λ∗NS of the
shadow price λ∗NS for allowing net selling as
[∑
a∈Ak
(
b0(t) +
∂Fk
∂qk,a(t)
(0)
)]+
|Ak| −
Lk
(‖qD∗k ‖+ ‖qD∗k ‖)√|Ak|

+
;
and the upper bound λ
∗
NS of the shadow price as[∑
a∈Ak
(
b0(t) +
∂Fk
∂qk,a(t)
(0)
)]+
|Ak| +
Lk
(‖qD∗k ‖+ ‖qD∗k ‖)√|Ak| .
From the above bounds, we can observe that the effect
of allowing net selling on social welfare improvement is
not due to a single appliance. Instead, it is affected by a
combination of all appliances, especially their initial utility
4. We could obtain the initial utility increasing rate by learning from
historical data or by surveys or tests for prosumers, obtain optimal
solutions of problems (I) and (III) by solving quadratic programming
problems, and obtain the operating point by direct measuring or
reading from meters. The implementation details, however, are out the
scope of this paper.
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increasing rates − ∂Fk∂qk,a(t) (0), which implies the high com-
plexity of accurate sensitivity analysis.
For two prosumers, if both of their average initial utility
increasing rates are no more than the utility company’s cost
and all other properties are similar (i.e., similar amounts of
appliances, qD∗k , Lk and q
D∗
k ), then the one with a lower
average initial utility increasing rate has a relatively higher
range of contribution potential on social welfare by allowing
them to net sell K units of energy.
5.4.3 Effects of Allowing EVs to Discharge
Allowing prosumer k’s EV (labeled by EV ) to discharge
at time period t is equivalent to relaxing the constraint
qDi,a (t) ≥ 0. Similarly, the constraint can be reformulated as
the jth general linear constraint for prosumer k (see Section
4.3.3). To obtain the upper and lower bounds of the shadow
price λ∗EV associated with the constraint, we can use GSAA,
i.e., substituting parameters of the constraint into Corollary
5.2. The lower bound λ∗EV becomes[[
b0(t) +
∂Fk
∂qk,EV (t)
(0)
]+
− Lk
(
‖qD∗k ‖+ ‖qD∗k ‖
)]+
;
(48)
the upper bound λ
∗
EV has the following form[
b0(t) +
∂Fk
∂qk,EV (t)
(0)
]+
+ Lk
(
‖qD∗k ‖+ ‖qD∗k ‖
)
. (49)
We can see that the above shadow price is monotonically
increasing in the current utility company’s production cost
and monotonically decreasing against the prosumer k’s ini-
tial utility increasing rate (when other parameters are fixed).
For two prosumers with similar qD∗k , Lk and q
D∗
k , the
one with a lower initial utility increasing rate − ∂Fk∂qk,EV (t) (0)
(not exceeding the utility company’s cost) has a relatively
higher range of contribution potential.
5.5 Case Study: Two Prosumers with EVs
Consider a simple one-time-period case (i.e., t ∈ H = {1}),
where we want to compare two prosumers, l and k, on their
potential to benefit social welfare by discharging their EVs.
We assume their negative net utility functions are related by
a constant factor, i.e.,
Fl (·) = βFk (·) , (β ∈ R+), (50)
and at optimal solution of their respective (P1) problems,
only EV discharging constraints −qDk,EV (t) ≤ 0 for both
k and l are tight. We next introduce a corollary based on
Eq. (50).
Corollary 5.3. If prosumer l’s and prosumer k’s negative net
utility functions satisfy Fl (·) = βFk (·), where β ∈ R+, Fk (·)
is µk-strongly convex and has Lk-Lipschitz continuous gradient
and rl = rl = 0 satisfy the assumption in Theorem 5.1 (1), i.e.,
for prosumer l, only the gth general linear constraint being tight
at the optimality of problems (De-I), (De-II) and (De-III), then the
optimal solutions qD∗
l
and qD∗l for prosumer l’s problems (De-I)
and (De-III) have the following forms
qD∗
l
= −∇Fk(0)
µk
− b0,l
βµk
− el [λ
∗
l ]g
βµk
, (51)
qD∗l = −
∇Fk(0)
Lk
− b0,l
βLk
− el[λ
∗
l ]g
βLk
. (52)
where b0,l = (b0,∀a ∈ Al); [λ∗l ]g and [λ
∗
l ]g are shadow prices
associated with the gth general linear constraint for prosumer l∑
a∈A(g)l
∑
t∈H(g)l,a
α
(g)
l,a (t) q
D
l,a (t) ≤ [hl]g ,
[λ∗l ]g =θl
[ ∑
a∈A(g)l
∑
t∈H(g)l,a
α
(g)
l,a (t)
[
−β ∂Fk
∂ql,a(t)
(0)− b0(t)
]
− βµk[hl]g
]+
, (53)
[λ
∗
l ]g =θl
[ ∑
a∈A(g)l
∑
t∈H(g)l,a
α
(g)
l,a (t)
[
−β ∂Fk
∂ql,a(t)
(0)− b0(t)
]
− βLk[hl]g
]+
, (54)
θl =
{ ∑
a∈A(g)l
∑
t∈H(g)l,a
[
α
(g)
l,a (t)
]2 }−1
,
and,
el =
((
α˜
(g)
l,a (t) ,∀t
)
,∀a ∈ A(g)l
)
,
for which
α˜
(g)
l,a (t) =
{
α
(g)
l,a (t) if t ∈ H(g)l,a
0 otherwise
.
Proof. Since Fk (·) is µk-strongly convex and has Lk-
Lipschitz continuous gradient, Fl (·) = βFk (·) is βµk-
strongly convex and has βLk-Lipschitz continuous gradient.
By first order optimality condition of problem (De-I) for
prosumer l, we have
βµkqD∗ − βµkr +∇Gl(r) +ATl λ∗l = 0.
Substituting rl = 0 to the above equation, we have
βµkqD∗l +∇Fl(0) + b0,l +A
T
l λ
∗
l = 0.
Using Fl (·) = βFk (·), we obtain
βµkqD∗l + β∇Fk(0) + b0,l +A
T
l λ
∗
l = 0. (55)
By complimentary slackness conditions, we have
ATl λ
∗
l = el [λ
∗
l ]g . (56)
Substituting Eq. (56) to Eq. (55) and with some basic calcu-
lations, we can obtain (51). Finally, using Eq. (27) in Dual
Bounding Theorem 5.1, we can obtain Eq. (53) by replacing
subscript j with g, replacing k with l, then substituting
rl = 0, ∇Fl(0) = β∇Fk(0) and µl = βµk. The proof for
Eq. (52) is omitted since the process is similar.
We will next focus on analyzing the constraint of the
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kind −qDk,EV (t) ≤ 0, which corresponds to the rth con-
straint for prosumer k and gth for prosumer l.
5.5.1 Example (β > 1)
Prosumer k can contribute more on social welfare than
prosumer l in EV discharging, even when k’s utility is less
than l’s utility. This case is shown by the following lemma.
Lemma 5.4. If β satisfies the following condition
1 <
−∇Fk(0) + Lk‖qD∗k ‖
−∇Fk(0)− Lk‖qD∗l ‖
< β <
b0(t)
−∇Fk(0) , (57)
then the shadow price [λ∗k]r associated with −qDk,a (t) ≤ 0 (the
gth general linear constraint for prosumer k), is larger than the
shadow price [λ∗l ]g associated with −qDl,a (t) ≤ 0 (the rth general
linear constraint for prosumer l), i.e., [λ∗k]r > [λ
∗
l ]g .
Proof. We prove the inequality by showing the upper bound
of [λ∗l ]g , [λ
∗
l ]
upper
g is less than the lower bound of [λ
∗
k]r ,
[λ∗k]
lower
r . First, from Eq. (49) and Eq. (50) we can obtain
[λ∗l ]
upper
g =
[
b0(t) + β
∂Fk
∂qk,a(t)
(0)
]+
+ βLk
(
‖qD∗l ‖+ ‖qD∗l ‖
)
. (58)
Substituting Eq. (52) to Eq. (58), we have
[λ∗l ]
upper
g =
[
b0(t) + β
∂Fk
∂qk,a(t)
(0)
]+
+ βLk
∥∥∥∥∥−∇Fk(0)Lk − b0,lβLk − el[λ
∗
l ]g
βLk
∥∥∥∥∥+ βLk‖qD∗l ‖.
Since we are considering the single-time-period case,
∂Fk
∂qk,a(t)
(0) = ∇Fk(0) and b0,l = b0(t). Also because the
constraint for the shadow price [λ∗l ]g is −qDl,a (t) ≤ 0, we
have el = −1. Hence, the above equation becomes
[λ∗l ]
upper
g = [b0(t) + β∇Fk(0)]+
+
∥∥∥−β∇Fk(0)− b0(t) + [λ∗l ]g∥∥∥+ βLk‖qD∗l ‖. (59)
By simplifying Eq. (54), we know [λ
∗
l ]g =
[b0(t) + β∇Fk(0)]+. Therefore, Eq. (59) becomes
[λ∗l ]
upper
g = [b0(t) + β∇Fk(0)]+ + ‖−β∇Fk(0)− b0(t)
+ [b0(t) + β∇Fk(0)]+
∥∥∥+ βLk‖qD∗l ‖. (60)
Notice that −∇Fk(0) represents the initial utility increas-
ing rate, which is positive by Assumption 2. Hence, from
Eq. (57) we know
b0(t) + β∇Fk(0) > 0. (61)
Having the above inequality, Eq. (60) can be simplified to
[λ∗l ]
upper
g = b0(t) + β∇Fk(0) + βLk‖qD∗l ‖. (62)
Next, we can obtain prosumer k’s shadow price lower
bound by using Eq. (48) and Eq. (52) (with letting β = 1
and replacing subscript l by k and g by r).
[λ∗k]
lower
r =
[
[b0(t) +∇Fk(0)]+ − Lk
∥∥∥∥−∇Fk(0)Lk
−b0,k
Lk
− ek[λ
∗
k]r
Lk
∥∥∥∥∥− Lk‖qD∗k ‖
]+
.
Similar to the process we analyzed the coefficients b0,l and
el for [λ∗l ]
upper
g , we can obtain b0,k = b0(t), ek = −1 and
[λ
∗
k]r = [b0(t) +∇Fk(0)]+. Hence, we have
[λ∗k]
lower
r =
[
[b0(t) +∇Fk(0)]+ − ‖−∇Fk(0)− b0(t)
+ [b0(t) +∇Fk(0)]+
∥∥∥− Lk‖qD∗k ‖]+. (63)
Recall that β > 1. Therefore, from Eq. (61), we have
b0(t) +∇Fk(0) > 0. (64)
Having the above inequality, Eq. (63) can be simplified to
[λ∗k]
lower
r =
[
b0(t) +∇Fk(0)− Lk‖qD∗l ‖
]+
. (65)
Last, by Eq. (57) and −∇Fk(0) + Lk‖qD∗l ‖ > 0, we have−∇Fk(0) − Lk‖qD∗l ‖ > 0. Hence, from Eq. (57), we can
obtain
∇Fk(0)− Lk‖qD∗k ‖ > β(∇Fk(0) + Lk‖qD∗l ‖).
Adding b0(t) on both sides of the above inequality, we have
b0(t) +∇Fk(0)− Lk‖qD∗k ‖
> b0(t) + β∇Fk(0) + βLk‖qD∗l ‖. (66)
Recall b0(t) is positive. Also by Eq. (61), we have the right
hand side of the above inequality is positive. Therefore, the
left hand side is also positive, which implies
[λ∗k]
lower
r = b0(t) +∇Fk(0)− Lk‖qD∗k ‖
> b0(t) + β∇Fk(0) + βLk‖qD∗l ‖ = [λ∗l ]upperg . (67)
Hence, we obtain [λ∗k]r ≥ [λ∗k]lowerr > [λ∗l ]upperg ≥ [λ∗l ]g .
5.5.2 Example (β < 1)
Prosumer l can contribute more on social welfare than
prosumer k in EV discharging, even when l’s utility is less
than k’s utility. This case is shown by the following lemma.
Lemma 5.5. If β satisfies the following condition
β <
−∇Fk(0) + Lk‖qD∗k ‖ − 2b0(t)
∇Fk(0)− Lk‖qD∗l ‖
<
b0(t)
−∇Fk(0) ≤ 1, (68)
then [λ∗l ]g > [λ
∗
k]r, where these shadow prices are defined as the
same as in Lemma 5.4.
Proof. We prove the inequality by showing the upper bound
of [λ∗k]r, [λ
∗
k]
upper
r is less than the lower bound of [λ
∗
l ]g ,
[λ∗l ]
lower
g . First, from Eq. (49) we have
[λ∗k]
upper
r =
[
b0(t) +
∂Fk
∂qk,a(t)
(0)
]+
+Lk
(
‖qD∗k ‖+ ‖qD∗k ‖
)
. (69)
Substituting Eq. (52) to Eq. (69), we can obtain
[λ∗k]
upper
r =
[
b0(t) +
∂Fk
∂qk,a(t)
(0)
]+
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+ Lk
∥∥∥∥∥−∇Fk(0)Lk − b0,kLk − ek[λ
∗
k]r
Lk
∥∥∥∥∥+ Lk‖qD∗k ‖.
Since we are considering the single-time-period case,
∂Fk
∂qk,a(t)
(0) = ∇Fk(0) and b0,k = b0(t). Also because the
constraint for the shadow price [λ∗k]r is −qDk,a (t) ≤ 0, we
have ek = −1. Hence, [λ∗k]upperr can be simplified to
[λ∗k]
upper
r = [b0(t) +∇Fk(0)]+ + ‖−∇Fk(0)
−b0(t) + [λ∗k]r
∥∥∥+ Lk‖qD∗k ‖. (70)
By replacing subscript l by k, setting β = 1 in Eq. (54), we
can obtain [λ
∗
k]r = [b0(t) +∇Fk(0)]+. Therefore, Eq. (70)
becomes
[λ∗k]
upper
r = [b0(t) +∇Fk(0)]+ + ‖−∇Fk(0)− b0(t)
+ [b0(t) +∇Fk(0)]+
∥∥∥+ Lk‖qD∗k ‖. (71)
Recall that −∇Fk(0) > 0. Hence, from Eq. (68) we know
b0(t) +∇Fk(0) ≤ 0,
thus Eq. (71) can be simplified to
[λ∗k]
upper
r = −b0(t)−∇Fk(0) + Lk‖qD∗k ‖. (72)
Next, we can obtain prosumer l’s shadow price lower bound
by using Eq. (48), Eq. (50) and Eq. (52) (when use Eq. (52),
let β = 1 and replace subscript l by k).
[λ∗l ]
lower
g =
[
[b0(t) + β∇Fk(0)]+ − βLk
∥∥∥∥−∇Fk(0)Lk
− b0,l
βLk
− el[λ
∗
l ]g
βLk
∥∥∥∥∥− βLk‖qD∗k ‖
]+
.
Similar to the process we analyzed the coefficients b0,k and
ek for [λ∗k]
upper
r , we can obtain b0,l = b0(t), el = −1
and [λ
∗
l ]g = [b0(t) + β∇Fk(0)]+. Hence [λ∗l ]lowerg can be
simplified to
[λ∗l ]
lower
g =
[
[b0(t) + β∇Fk(0)]+ − ‖−β∇Fk(0)− b0(t)
+ [b0(t) + β∇Fk(0)]+
∥∥∥− βLk‖qD∗k ‖]+. (73)
From Eq. (68), we have
b0(t) + β∇Fk(0) > 0. (74)
Having the above inequality, Eq. (73) can be simplified to
[λ∗l ]
lower
g =
[
b0(t) + β∇Fk(0)− βLk‖qD∗l ‖
]+
. (75)
This is the lower bound of prosumer l’s shadow price [λ∗l ]g .
Last, by Eq. (68), we know ∇Fk(0) − Lk‖qD∗l ‖ < 0 and−∇Fk(0) +Lk‖qD∗k ‖− 2b0(t) < 0. Hence, from Eq. (68), we
can obtain
β
(
∇Fk(0)− Lk‖qD∗k ‖
)
> −∇Fk(0) + Lk‖qD∗k ‖ − 2b0(t).
Adding b0(t) on both sides of the above inequality, we have
b0(t) + β∇Fk(0)− βLk‖qD∗k ‖
> −b0(t)−∇Fk(0) + Lk‖qD∗k ‖.
b0(t) −∇Fk(0)0
1
2b0(t)− Lk‖qD∗k ‖
β
f0
f2
f1
f1
−‖qk‖‖ql‖
Lk‖qD∗l ‖
(
b0(t),
b0(t)+Lk‖qD∗k ‖
b0(t)−Lk‖qD∗l ‖
)
(
b0(t),
−b0(t)+Lk‖qD∗k ‖
−b0(t)−Lk‖qD∗l ‖
)
b0(t)
Lk‖qD∗l ‖
Fig. 1: Feasible areas of β for the above two examples
Since −b0(t)−∇Fk(0) + Lk‖qD∗k ‖ = [λ∗k]upperr is nonnega-
tive. Therefore, the left hand side of the above inequality is
positive, which implies
[λ∗l ]
lower
g = b0(t) + β∇Fk(0)− βLk‖qD∗k ‖
> −b0(t)−∇Fk(0) + Lk‖qD∗k ‖ = [λ∗k]upperr . (76)
Hence, we have [λ∗l ]g ≥ [λ∗l ]lowerg > [λ∗k]upperr ≥ [λ∗k]r .
The feasible areas of β for the above two examples
are depicted in Figure (1). The three functions f0, f1 and
f2 in terms of prosumer k’s initial utility increasing rate
−∇Fk(0), replaced by x for convenience, are given be-
low. f0 (x) =
b0(t)
x , f1 (x) =
x+Lk‖qD∗k ‖
x−Lk‖qD∗l ‖
, f2 (x) =
x+Lk‖qD∗k ‖−2b0(t)
−x−Lk‖qD∗l ‖
. In the above figure, the red area is when
β > 1, where we would expect prosumer l to have a higher
impact, but surprisingly k′s multiplier has a higher range,
and the blue area is for β < 1, where prosumer k with lower
utility function but a higher impact on social welfare.
6 NUMERICAL STUDIES
We illustrate the usage of GSAA by considering the DR
market consists of 2 prosumers, 1 utility company and 1
DSO. Here we use GSAA in an incremental way to estimate
a prosumer’s contribution potential, meaning that we in-
crease the resource capacity of the general linear constraint
for GSAA in small increments and then update GSAA
iteratively instead of using GSAA only once for a large
change of resource capacity.
First, we test GSAA usage under quadratic settings in
a 24-time-period DR market, where each prosumer has
two appliances: energy storage (labeled by ES) and an EV
(labeled by EV). Both appliances have quadratic net utility
functions, where the coefficients follow the signs in Table 1.
Specifically, we let the second order coefficients aˆi,ES (t) for
two prosumers’ ES net utility be randomly selected from
[−0.05,−0.02], here aˆ1,ES (t) = −0.02 and aˆ2,ES (t) =
−0.035. The second order coefficients aˆi,EV (t) and the first
order coefficients bˆi,EV (t) of EVs’ net utility are randomly
selected from [−0.04,−0.01] and [0.1, 0.5] respectively. In
this experiment, aˆ1,EV (t) = −0.01, aˆ2,EV (t) = −0.015,
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bˆ1,EV (t) = 0.1 and bˆ2,EV (t) = 0.2. All other coefficients
are 0 based on Table 1. The utility company’s production
cost b0(t) is randomly chosen from [0.2, 0.6] and here we
have b0(t) = 0.4. For simplicity, we let the coefficients of
prosumers’ net utility remain unchanged over time and
only include one constraint at the 1st time period in the
model and make sure the constraint is tight at optimality.
We conduct two experiments about using GSAA to compare
the prosumers’ marginal contribution on social welfare. The
first one is on the net selling effects, which is shown in
Figure 2. As we can see, both prosumers’ contributions on
social welfare increase as their allowed net-selling amounts
(i.e., resource capacities) increase and each estimation given
by GSAA is always an upper bound to the real contribution
of the corresponding prosumer. For the same amount of
allowed net-selling for both prosumers, the estimation by
GSAA implies that prosumer 1’s contribution potential (red
lines with markers) is larger than prosumer 2’s (blue lines
with markers). This claim is verified by the fact that 1’s real
contribution (red line without marker) is higher than 2’s
(blue line without marker). We can also see that when the
allowed net-selling amounts are small, the estimations by
GSAA could relatively well reflects the prosumers’ poten-
tial. However, as the allowed net-selling amount increases
the estimation error becomes larger (This error will finally
remain unchanged after exceeding some value). Hence,
GSAA should be used carefully, if some prosumer’s allowed
net-selling amount is too large.
The second simulation is on allowing EV discharging,
which is shown in Figure 3. In this test, the estimation by
GSAA is very close to the prosumers’ real contribution on
social welfare, even as the allowed EV discharging amount
becomes large. Hence, in this test, the estimation by GSAA
can help us quickly decide who has more contribution po-
tential on social welfare when they are allowed to discharge
EVs.
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Fig. 2: Prosumers’ marginal con-
tribution on social welfare with
allowed net-selling amount, M .
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Fig. 3: Prosumers’ marginal con-
tributions with change of EV ini-
tial utility increasing rate, bˆi,a (t).
Next, we test GSAA performance under the general
convex settings. The experiments are designed to simulate
the case in Section 5.5. For simplicity, we let each prosumer
have only one appliance: an EV. We use quadratic func-
tions as prosumers net utility functions since they satisfy
the relevant assumptions. The coefficients of prosumer 1’s
EV net utility function are generated in the same way as
in the previous simulation, here aˆ1,EV (t) = −0.01 and
bˆ1,EV (t) = 0.1. The coefficients for prosumer 2’s EV net
utility function are prosumer 1’s scaled up by a positive
number β. Here we use β = 2. However, the above
information are not accessible by GSAA. GSAA only has
information about the degree of strong convexity, µi, the
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Fig. 4: Optimal social welfare
improvement bounds with rise of
prosumer 1’s EV initial utility in-
creasing rate, bˆ1,EV (t).
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Fig. 5: Using shadow price
bounds to compare contributions
of two EVs’ discharging on opti-
mal social welfare improvements.
Lipschitz constant, Li, for prosumers’ net utility functions,
prosumers’ operating points and initial utility increasing
rates5. We set µ1 = 0.018, L1 = 0.022, µ2 = 0.036 and
L1 = 0.044. The utility company’s cost b0(t) is still chosen
in the same way as in the previous simulation, here we have
b0(t) = 0.4. The first experiment in Figure 4 shows the
bounds of a prosumer 1’s marginal contribution on social
welfare estimated by GSAA with and without knowing 1’s
net utility functions, and also shows the real marginal con-
tribution. From the figure, we can see that both real optimal
social welfare improvement and the estimation of optimal
social welfare improvement given by the actual shadow
price are bounded by the estimation based on the upper
and lower bounds of shadow price. The figure also shows
that as EV’s initial utility increasing rate bˆ1,EV (t) changes,
the estimation given by the upper bound of the shadow
price works well when bˆ1,EV (t) is smaller than a threshold,
the point where EV discharging stops contributing on the
social welfare. However, when EV’s initial utility increasing
rate bˆ1,EV (t) is larger than the threshold, the estimation
given by the upper bound of the shadow price begins to
bounce up. The second experiment, shown in Figure 5,
illustrates using the bounds obtained by GSAA, as indirect
information, to compare two prosumers’ potential on con-
tributing social welfare. When the allowed EV-discharging
amounts are smaller than 2 units and one’s lower bound by
GSAA is higher than the other’s upper bound by GSAA,
the bounds given by GSAA is sufficient for us to make a
conclusion about who has more contribution potential on
social welfare. For example, when prosumer 1 and prosumer
2 have 1 unit of allowed EV-discharging amount, by GSAA
we can see that prosumer 1 has more contribution potential
than prosumer 2 because 1’s lower bound given by GSAA
is higher than 2’s upper bound given by GSAA, despite the
fact that 2 has a higher utility function. This is also verified
by the real contribution values. However, as the same as in
the quadratic settings, estimations by GSAA should be used
cautiously when the resource capacity change is too large,
since the estimation error could also be large at this time
and may lead to inaccurate prediction.
5. The operating points and the initial utility increasing rates can be
obtained since we have the specific coefficients of each prosumer’s net
utility function, even though GSAA does not have information about
these coefficients.
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7 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we consider an H-period DR market model
consists of one distribution system operator, price-taking
prosumers with various appliances, and an electric utility
company. We show that there exists an efficient competitive
equilibrium and an equivalence relationship between DSO’s
problem and the prosumers’ and the utility company’s indi-
vidual problems. Based on the equivalence relationship and
duality theory of convex optimization, we propose a general
sensitivity analysis approach (GSAA) to analyze the effect of
individual prosumers’ contribution on social welfare, when
their DR resource capacity is increased. We characterize
closed-form shadow prices associated with the constrain-
ing resources, when the net utility function has quadratic
form and provide the bounds of the shadow prices when
the utility functions have general convex properties. The
shadow prices can then be used to estimate improvement
in social welfare and identify the most contributing pro-
sumer(s). Thus, when the budgets for implementing DR
(such as campaign/advertisement, device upgrade and in-
stallation, or the construction of infrastructure supporting
EV discharging or net-selling) are limited, we could allocate
the resources to the most contributing prosumers. Several
applications of GSAA are provided, including enlarging a
prosumer’s AC comfort zone size, allowing a prosumer’s
EV to discharge and allowing a prosumer to net sell. We
also provide several numerical studies on net-selling and
EV discharging, which confirm our theoretical predictions.
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